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Raising money for the state
In a nutshell 
No state can exist in the long term without effective taxation.  
To be able to execute its various roles, the state needs to acquire  
the capacity to enforce compliance with tax obligations. Taxation 
is particularly challenging in developing countries, since it is 
difficult for the governments to gain information about what taxable 
transactions occur in more informal economies. This does not  
only lead to large losses in government revenue, it can also create 
negative distortions in the economy. The pressing need to tackle 
tax evasion has led to growing interest in ‘third-party reporting’ – 
the verification of taxpayer reports against other sources. 
This policy brief explores the potential of such an approach to 
improve tax collection – as well as its limitations. Evidence from 
Chile shows how the value-added tax (VAT) can facilitate tax 
enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between 
firms. But third-party information is not a miracle cure against 
evasion. Its effectiveness can be severely reduced if the government's 
enforcement capacity is low or if taxpayers can make offsetting 
adjustments on other margins for which third-party information is not 
available, as a study from Ecuador shows.
Opportunities for action
1
Certain forms of taxation such 
as the VAT generate incentives 
for firms to produce third-party 
information on transactions 
between firms, which has the 
potential to increase tax 
compliance.
2
To be effective, the use of 
paper trails needs to go in 
tandem with strong auditing 
and enforcement capacities.
3
Enforcing formalization at the 
final stage of production might 
contribute to formalizing entire 
production chains.
2
In detail 
Strengthening state capacity and the ability 
to effectively and fairly collect taxes is a 
key priority for many governments around 
the world. Modern states execute a  
broad range of roles, ranging from assuring 
security, rule of law, and building infra-
structure to providing services in the 
areas of education and health, or social 
programs. To be able to effectively 
implement these policies, countries need 
to acquire the ability to enforce compliance 
with tax obligations. 
Raising tax collection 
capacity also allows countries 
to reduce their dependence on 
international aid. 
Low tax collection a century ago was not 
merely a political choice. Countries simply 
lacked the capacity for tax collection 
(e.g. Kleven et al. 2016). Throughout the 
twentieth century, most richer countries 
acquired a much higher tax collection 
capacity, and most high-income countries 
today have tax/GDP ratios between 25% 
an 50%. But countries with lower income 
per capita tend to have lower tax capacity 
and a smaller tax/GDP ratio (Figure 1). 
Combining a low GDP with less taxes 
collected as a share of GDP means the tax 
revenues are much lower than those in rich 
countries. In some countries, tax collection 
is smaller than international aid, and in 
low-income countries on average these two 
types of government revenue are of similar 
magnitude. In contrast, in middle-income 
countries, tax revenues are on average over 
50 times larger than official development 
assistance (ODA), as shown in Figure 2. 
Raising tax collection capacity also allows 
countries to reduce their dependence on 
international aid.
Tax evasion is a fundamental challenge  
for developing countries, where the 
informal sector often accounts for a 
substantial share of the economy. 
Historically, governments have relied 
on audits as a way to enforce tax 
compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 
1972). Recently, alongside the global 
revolution in information technology, 
governments are increasingly turning to 
‘third-party information’. This involves 
verifying taxpayer reports against other 
sources, such as employer reports of salary 
and VAT invoices, as a cheaper and more 
scalable tax enforcement strategy (Kleven 
et al, 2011; Naritomi, 2016).
Can tax policies that rely on third-party 
information improve tax collection in 
developing economies? I have explored this 
question in two recent studies in Chile and 
Ecuador. 
Chile: deterrence and self- 
enforcement in the VAT chain
One of the key challenges in tax admin-
istration is that, to impose any tax, the 
state needs information about the taxable 
transactions taking place in the economy. 
This is particularly difficult in less developed 
economies, where many firms are not 
registered, and even among registered firms, 
a substantial share of transactions remains 
informal. Governments in these countries 
therefore tend to have much less information 
about taxable transactions (e.g. Gordon and 
Li, 2009 and Kleven et al., 2016).
Recent research collaborations with tax 
authorities have therefore focused on 
evaluating mechanisms aimed at increasing 
the information to which the tax authority 
has access. One key source of information 
in this context is “third-party reporting” 
(e.g. Kopczuk and Slemrod 2006, Gordon 
and Li 2009, Kleven et al. 2016). Such 
reporting happens when an agent in the 
economy has an incentive to report informa-
tion to the government that includes
evidence of a tax obligation by another 
agent. This then creates a paper trail of 
information that the government can use 
for tax enforcement.
3
The VAT is paid by firms on the value-
added portion of their sales, i.e. on sales 
minus input costs. It had long been thought
to have a “self-enforcing” property by 
providing downstream client firms with an 
incentive to ask suppliers for a receipt, 
which they can use to deduct the input costs 
from the VAT. This creates an auditable 
paper trail along the production chain 
(Figure 3). Due in part to the claimed self-
enforcing property of VAT, the number of 
countries that adopted a VAT has increased 
from 50 in 1990 to over 165 today 
(OECD, 2016). 
Yet rigorous evidence on the effectiveness 
of such a paper trail was scarce until 
recently. In many countries, firms often 
do not report information about their sup-
pliers to the tax authority, and final 
consumers of a finished product or service 
do not have the same incentive to request 
receipts as firms do. These limitations 
may challenge the self-enforcement 
mechanism of VAT.
To examine this empirically, we partnered 
with the Chilean Tax Authority and sent 
letters to over 100,000 randomly selected 
firms, informing them that they had been 
randomly selected for special scrutiny 
and might be audited. We then analyzed 
whether the paper trail can act as a 
substitute for the audit probability by 
measuring whether increased tax enforce-
ment had less impact where the paper trail 
was present. This was indeed the case: 
while the reported sales to final consumers 
increased sharply, firms did not noticeably 
change reported sales to other firms or input 
costs (Figure 4). In other words, a message 
announcing increased tax monitoring 
through audits had a much smaller effect 
on the reporting of transactions that were 
already covered by a paper trail.
We carried out a second experiment to 
observe the self-enforcement mechanism in 
action. In this experiment, we tested 
whether increasing enforcement on one 
firm leads to spillovers up the VAT chain. 
To do this, the tax authority selected 5,600 
small firms suspected of tax evasion to 
be audited. Half of them were randomly 
selected to receive a pre-announcement 
of an upcoming audit, while the other half 
did not receive any advance notice.
In line with the prediction of the “self-
enforcing” mechanism in the VAT, the 
audit announcement not only increased tax 
payments of the firms receiving the audit 
pre-announcement, but also of their 
suppliers. This suggests that firms expecting 
audits began demanding receipts from 
their suppliers as proof of their input costs. 
The demand for receipts created a paper 
trail documenting the sales of suppliers, 
forcing them to increase their VAT 
payments to avoid punishment for tax 
evasion.
Benefits of a verifiable paper trail
These findings suggest that verifiable 
paper trails can be a powerful tool for tax 
enforcement. Taxes such as the VAT 
may provide an advantage over other 
forms of taxation, such as a retail sales tax, 
because of the stronger paper trail. 
However, the results also show that 
information must be combined with 
deterrence to achieve effective tax 
enforcement. 
Verifiable paper trails 
generated by a VAT system can 
be a powerful tool for tax 
enforcement
The mere existence of the paper trail created 
by a VAT system does not incentivize firms 
toaccurately declare tax liabilities if the 
risk of being audited is low. The firms in the 
second experiment had low compliance 
before announcing audits; heightening 
deterrence by preannouncing audits was 
necessary to trigger the effectiveness of the 
VAT paper trail and increase tax payments 
by supplier firms.
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Figure 2: 
Tax revenues in low- and 
middle-income countries
Figure 4: 
Impacts on sales to final consumers 
vs. sales to other firms
Figure 3: 
The VAT chain creates 
a paper trail
Figure 5: 
Discrepancies notifications 
in Ecuador
Amending 
firms
Low-income countries Middle-income countries
Incentive to 
ask for receipt
Incentive to 
ask for receipt
No incentive
Firm 1
Firm 2
Firm 3
Consumer
Notified 
firms
Notes: Tax revenues in low- and middle-income 
countries compared to other financial flows. 
Abbreviations: FDI, foreign direct investment; 
ODA, official development assistance.
Source: Pomeranz & Vila-Belda (2019), adapted from 
World Bank (2011).
Notes: Percent difference between deterrence letter 
and control group in the probability of declaring more 
than in the same of the previous year.
Source: Pomeranz (2015, appendix).
Notes: The figure depicts treatment effects on 
revenue, costs and tax liability from our project in 
Ecuador. “Amending firms” are firms that made 
an amendment after receiving the discrepancy 
notification from the Ecuadorian Tax Authority. 
“Notified firms” are all the firms that were 
notified, including those that did not file the 
requested amendment.
Notes: This figure illustrates the differing 
incentives that firms face when making sales to 
other firms versus to the final consumer.
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The mere existence of the paper 
trail created by a VAT system 
does not incentivize firms to 
accurately declare tax liabilities 
if the risk of being audited is 
low
VAT may encourage firms along the entire 
production chain to become part of the 
formal economy. Where VAT is present, 
formal firms tend to trade with other 
formal firms, since the latter can provide 
them with receipts that allow them 
to deduct their input costs from VAT 
payments. At the same time, informal 
firms tend to trade among themselves. 
Enforcing formalization at the final stage 
of production might contribute to 
formalizing entire production chains.
Forms of taxation that generate more 
information for the tax authority may have 
potential for improving tax collection. 
Other mechanisms, such as online billing 
systems or electronic receipts, may have 
high returns.
Enforcing formalization at the 
final stage of production might 
contribute to formalizing entire 
production chains
Ecuador: limitations of third-party 
reporting 
The finding from Chile – that it was the 
combination of information with effective 
enforcement capacity that led to tax 
compliance – proved to be critical in a 
follow-up study that we undertook in col-
laboration with the tax authority in 
Ecuador (SRI), joint with Paul Carrillo 
and Monica Singhal. Ecuador had recently 
acquired the capability to electronically 
cross-check third-party information on a 
large scale. This allowed us to study the 
impact of the introduction of large-scale 
tax enforcement based on information 
cross-checks, and the challenges involved 
in such a policy reform. 
Using VAT data, as well as other sources 
such as credit card sales, the Ecuadorian 
tax authority developed estimates of a 
firm's revenues based on third-party 
information. Almost 8,000 firms were 
notified about large discrepancies detected 
between the sales they had reported and 
third-party estimates. The tax authority 
hoped that this would lead to a large 
increase in tax collection. However, the 
impact was below expectation, along two 
dimensions.
First, a large share of firms did not respond 
to the message. They anticipated – correctly 
– that the government did not have the 
capacity to formally audit and process the 
legal enforcement on so many firms in a 
short period of time. When overall compli-
ance is low, firms can rationally assume 
that government cannot prosecute 
everyone.
Second, among the firms that did respond 
and increased their reported revenues, 
there was a large compensating reaction: 
they also increased their reported costs by 
a similar amount, leading to only small 
increases in tax payments (Figure 5). When 
third-party reporting is available on one 
margin of the tax declaration but not on 
others (in this example costs), the effec-
tiveness of third-party reporting for tax 
enforcement can be severely limited. 
This concern can be an argument in favor 
of forms of taxation that provide third-
party information covering the full tax 
base, as in the case of the turnover tax, 
as suggested by Best et al. (2015).
Conclusions
What does this imply for the role of third-
party reporting as a tool to develop tax 
enforcement capacity? On the one hand, 
these results show that paper trails are 
not a panacea and not something that can 
be turned on and that become effective 
immediately like a light switch. On the other 
hand, third-party information can still play 
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a very important role in a number of ways.
First, when some transactions and firms 
are compliant with third-party reporting, 
authorities can focus their scarce auditing 
resources on the rest of the economy. 
Second, the deterrence power of paper 
trails can be built and strengthened over 
time. When firms report more costs, they 
have more incentives to ask for receipts, 
thereby increasing the coverage of the 
paper trail. The more firms comply and the 
more transactions are covered by paper 
trails, the more credible it is that authorities 
will clamp down on the rest. 
The deterrence power of 
paper trails can be built and 
strengthened over time.
To build this deterrence power, it may 
be in the interest of tax authorities to 
only send a small number of notices of 
discrepancies in the beginning. With this, 
they have the capacity to follow up with 
enforcement on all taxpayers who do not 
respond to the notice or respond in a highly 
suspicious way (such as increasing costs 
by the exact same amount as revenues, as in 
the Ecuadorian experience). Over time, 
an increasingly larger share of taxpayers 
will respond to such notices, and so an 
increasingly large number of notices could 
be sent with a constant capacity for follow-
up on non-compliers. 
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